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Abstract
This paper is a ﬁrst step in investigating the competitive and welfare eﬀects of behaviour-
based price discrimination (BBPD) in markets where ﬁrms have information to employ re-
tention strategies as an attempt to raise barriers to switching. We focus on retention activity
in the form of a discount oﬀered to a consumer expressing an intention to switch. When save
activity is allowed forward looking ﬁrms anticipate the eﬀect of ﬁrst period market share
on second period proﬁts and so they price more aggressively in the ﬁrst-period. Thus, ﬁrst
period equilibrium price with BBPD and save activity is below its non-discrimination coun-
terpart. This contrasts with ﬁrst period price above the non-discrimination level if BBPD
is used and save activity is forbidden. Regarding second period prices, retention discounts
increase the price oﬀered to those consumers who do not signal am intention to switch. The
reverse happens to those consumer who decide to switch after being exposed to retention
oﬀers. As in other models where consumers have stable exogenous brand preferences, the
instrument of behaviour based price discrimination is bad for proﬁts and welfare but good for
consumers. However, BBPD with the additional tool of retention activity boosts consumer
surplus and overall welfare but decreases industry proﬁt.
1 Introduction
In markets with repeated purchases ﬁrms frequently use the consumers’ purchase history to
quote diﬀerent prices to existing and new customers. When trade among consumers is not
feasible, ﬁrms can try to poach the competitors’ current customers, by oﬀering them special
inducements to switch. This form of price discrimination, termed behaviour-based price dis-
crimination (BBPD), sometimes also called price discrimination based on purchase history or
∗An early version of this paper was prepared to the Ofcom Workshop on the Economics of Switching Costs. I
thank the workshop participants especially Geoﬀrey Myers and Khaled Diaw for helpful discussions and sugges-
tions. Thanks for comments on a early version of this paper is also due to Patrick Rey and Rune Stenbacka and
participants of the 2010 EARIE Conference. Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia is
gratefully acknowledged.
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dynamic pricing, is now widely observed in many markets. In the communications markets, for
instance, ﬁrms frequently oﬀer a lower price to a customer who has been using a competitor’s ser-
vice. Similar pricing strategies are employed in several other markets, especially in those where
consumers face a cost to switch to a new supplier (e.g. magazine or newspaper subscriptions,
credit cards, banking services, electricity and gas.)1
Although this type of behaviour-based price discrimination has received much attention in the
economics literature in the recent years,2 the literature has hitherto focused on the assumption
that ﬁrms have only the required information to price discriminate between existing and new
customers and that ﬁrms have no way to react to the rivals’ poaching oﬀers.
Interestingly, in some of the markets where ﬁrms often discriminate between their own and
the rivals’ consumers, the switching processes currently in place in many countries have allowed
ﬁrms to become aware of an existing customer’s willingness to switch before the switching takes
place. In the UK this kind of switching process is known as Losing Provider Led (LPL). In a
LPL process, the consumer must go through a validation process with its existing provider, a
proof of which must be provided to his new provider in order to complete a switch. In other
words, ﬁrms have been increasingly able to recognise diﬀerent categories of old customers−those
showing a desire to leave (active consumers) and those showing no intention to switch (passive
consumers)−and price discriminate accordingly. A recent report by the Ofcom (2010) states
that in the UK consumers wishing to switch their mobile telephony services must contact their
existing provider and request a porting authorisation code (PAC) which they must communicate
to their new provider in order to complete the switching process. The same procedure is applied
for switching broadband services, in which case the required code is the migrations authorisation
code (MAC).3
Thus, in the communications markets, mainly in broadband, mobile telephony and bundles
comprising either of these services, apart from being able to know whether or not a consumer
purchased from a rival in the past, ﬁrms can now have the tool to know as well whether or
not a previous customer is willing to switch. Empowered with this additional information
ﬁrms can have the last word over their competitors poaching oﬀers. The request of a code
discloses information about a consumer willingness to switch and allows ﬁrms to oﬀer counter-
1A recent report by the Oﬃce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem (2008)), the regulator for Britain’s gas
and electricity industries, has revealed that, in this industry: (i) a substantial fraction of consumers are ‘switchers’
in the sense that they constantly seek out for the best deal in the market; and (ii) suppliers are well aware of
these consumers’ dynamics and do take them into account in their pricing decisions. In particular, “companies
charge more to existing (“sticky”) customers whilst maintaining competitiveness in more price sensitive segments
of the market.
2Chen (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present updated literature surveys on
BBPD.
3 It is important to mention that for mobile services, a PAC code is required only where the consumer wants to
keep his existing telephone number with the new provider (porting); otherwise, if the consumer is taking a new
number, she/he can just deal directly with the new provider without the need for a PAC code.
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oﬀers to those customers expressing an intention to leave as an attempt to retain them. Firms
can employ save/retention strategies. Theoretically, a ﬁrm uses a retention/save activity−e.g.
targeted discounting, price matching, loyalty discounts−as a way to make it less attractive for
a customer to switch to a competing ﬁrm. However, the Ofcom report (2010, p.82) states that
save activity is generally in the form of a price discount.
The ability of ﬁrms to engage in retention strategies will make it diﬃcult for ﬁrms to attract
rivals’ customers and will potentially raise competitive, welfare and antitrust concerns. Some
interesting issues are the following. What is the impact of customer poaching with retention
activity on prices and competition? Does BBPD with save activity enhances consumer surplus?
Do ﬁrms charge “excessive prices” to those consumers who do not signal an intention to switch?
Does BBPD with retention strategies enhance the dominance of the ﬁrm with a higher customer
base? What are the dynamic eﬀects of BBPD with save activity?
Despite the crucial importance of these issues, the answer to these and other related questions
is not yet known. This paper aims to contribute to close this gap in the literature on BBPD. It
investigates the competitive and welfare eﬀects of customer poaching with retention activity in
the form of a price discount4 oﬀered to a consumer expressing an intention to switch.
The paper considers a two-period model where two horizontally diﬀerentiated ﬁrms compete
for consumers with stable exogenous brand preferences across the two periods. These preferences
are speciﬁed in the Hotelling-style linear market of unit length with ﬁrms positioned at the
endpoints. Firms cannot commit to future prices. In period 1 because ﬁrms have no information
about consumers’ brand preferences they quote a uniform price. In period 2 there are two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms use the consumers’ ﬁrst period purchase history to draw inferences about
their preferences and price accordingly. They simultaneously choose a price to their old and the
rival’s previous customers. In the second stage, those customers for whom the rival’s oﬀer is
more attractive (with a desire to switch) need to contact their current supplier and request an
authorization code which they must communicate to the new supplier to complete the switching
process. This signal allows each ﬁrm to recognise within the group of existing customers those
willing to willing to switch (active) and oﬀer them a secret save oﬀer in the form of a ﬁxed
discount. Thus, save activity is targeted at consumers expressing an intention to leave and is
enabled by a switching process in which a provider is made aware of a customer’s intention to
switch before the switching takes place (a LPL process).
In order to investigate the static and dynamic eﬀects of BBPD with retention strategies
Section 3 presents the benchmark case where ﬁrms can only price discriminate between old/new
customers. Here we present a simpliﬁed version of the Fudenberg-Tirole model. Save activity is
not possible either because it is not allowed or because ﬁrms have no information to recognise
those customers willing to leave.
4Retention oﬀers can take other forms apart from a price discount, as for instance, oﬀering the consumer a
diﬀerent package or diﬀerent features.
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Section 4 extends the model by allowing ﬁrms to oﬀer a discount to a consumer expressing
an intention to switch. The second-period static analysis sheds some light on the price eﬀects of
BBPD with save activity given an inherit market share. BBPD with save activity can lead to
higher prices to passive existing consumers and to higher or lower prices to retained customers.
With retention activity ﬁrms have more diﬃculty in attracting the rival’s customers. Thus, they
need to be more aggressive and so the poaching price under save activity is below its counterpart
when this activity is banned. We will also see that ﬁrms will only engage in save activity when
their customer base is above a threshold (i.e., above 33%).
The second period static analysis sheds also some light on whether or not poaching with
retention strategies can help a dominant ﬁrm (with a market share above 50%) to maintain
its dominant position. We will see that if BBPD is possible but save activity is forbidden, the
dominant ﬁrm will lose its dominance under BBPD (Corollary 1). A similar result is obtained
in Gehrig et al. (2012). In contrast, we will see that if the dominant ﬁrm is big enough (with
a market share above 75%) BBPD with save activity reduces its dominance but allows the ﬁrm
to remain the dominant (with a market share above 50%).
While static analysis is a useful tool, a dynamic analysis is the most appropriate to inform
competition authorities specially for assessing businesses practices that exhibit intertemporal
features. The paper shows that BBPD under retention strategies gives rise to new dynamic
eﬀects. In the Fudenberg-Tirole model ﬁrst-period prices are above the non-discrimination level
because consumers anticipate poaching and become less price sensitive. When save activity is
introduced, ﬁrst-period prices are below the non-discrimination levels because forward looking
ﬁrms play more aggressively to build up ﬁrst-period market share. In equilibrium, both ﬁrms
share the ﬁrst-period market symmetrically. BBPD with save activity leads to all-out competi-
tion in period 2. With save activity passive customers pay higher prices than active consumers
and these prices will be above the prices they would pay if ﬁrms were only allowed to price
discriminate between old/new customers. Because the current supplier is always informed of
the consumer’s intention to switch, it appears to be a relatively costless strategy to charge a
high price and lower it only when a switching intention materialises. As in Fudenberg-Tirole
model, if retention strategy is not available, BBPD is socially ineﬃcient, since in the second
period 13 of consumers buy from the less preferred ﬁrm. If save activity is possible, only
1
5 of the
consumer population switch suppliers in equilibrium.
As in other models of BBPD with exogenous brand preferences, the instrument of behavior
based price discrimination is bad for proﬁts and welfare but good for consumers. However, con-
ditional on price discrimination being permitted, the use of retention strategies boosts consumer
surplus and overall welfare and decreases industry proﬁt (Proposition 5). Save activity is welfare
enhancing because it reduces ineﬃcient switching.
This paper is related to the literature on competitive price discrimination,5 especially the
5Comprehensive surveys on competitive price discrimination are presented by Armstrong (2006) and Stole
4
literature on behaviour-based price discrimination, 6where ﬁrms engage in price discrimination
based on information about the consumers’ past purchases. Like other forms of price discrimin-
ation, BBPD can raise competition and welfare concerns. While in the switching cost approach
purchase history discloses information about exogenous switching costs (e.g. Chen (1997) and
Taylor (2003)), in the brand preference approach purchase history discloses information about
a consumer’s exogenous brand preference for a ﬁrm (e.g. Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000)). A common ﬁnding in this literature is that BBPD tends to intensify competition
and potentially beneﬁt consumers. Behaviour-based pricing tends to intensify competition and
reduce proﬁts in duopoly models where the market exhibits best response asymmetry,7 ﬁrms are
symmetric and both have information to engage in BBPD (e.g. Chen (1997), Villas-Boas (1999),
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Taylor (2003) and Esteves (2010)). There are, however, some mod-
els where ﬁrms can beneﬁt from BBPD. This will generally occur when ﬁrms are asymmetric
(e.g. Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000)), when ﬁrms’ targetability is imperfect and asymmetric (Chen
et al. (2001)) and when only one of the two ﬁrms can recognize customers and price discrimin-
ate (Chen and Zhang (2009) and Esteves (2009)). Another relevant paper is Chen (2008) who
investigates BBPD in markets with asymmetric ﬁrms. He shows that a suﬃcient condition for
dynamic price discrimination to beneﬁt consumers is that it does not result in fewer ﬁrms and
that consumers have a long time horizon. Finally, the paper is related to Gehrig et al. (2012)
who investigate the eﬀects of BBPD in a static asymmetric duopoly, where one of the ﬁrms is
assumed to have an inherited dominant market position (market share larger than 50%). They
show that uniform pricing is a more powerful instrument than BBPD for the dominant ﬁrm to
defend its market share advantage.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents
the benchmark case where ﬁrms can only discriminate between old/new customers. Section 4
analysis the model of behaviour-based pricing with retention strategy in the form of a price
discount oﬀered to a consumer expressing an intention to switch. Section 5 looks at the welfare
eﬀects of customer poaching under retention activity. Section 6 presents some of the extensions
to be explored in a more complete version of this paper. Section 7 concludes and the appendix
collects the proofs that were omitted from the text.
(2007).
6Chen (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present updated literature surveys on
BBPD.
7Following Corts (1998), the market exhibits best response asymmetry when one ﬁrm’s “strong” market is the
other’s “weak” market. In BBPD models there is best-response asymmetry because each ﬁrm regards its previous
clientele as its strong market and the rival’s previous customers as its weak market.
8For other recent papers on BBPD and customer recognition see also Chen and Pearcy (2010), Esteves (2010),
Esteves and Vasconcelos (2012), Esteves and Regiani (2012), Gehrig, Shy and Stenbacka (2011), (2012), Ghose
and Huang (2006), Ouksel and Eruysal (2011), Shy and Stenbacka (2011), (2012).
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2 Model
Two ﬁrms, A and B, produce at zero marginal cost nondurable goods A and B.9 There are two
periods, 1 and 2. On the demand side, there is population of consumers with mass normalized
to 1. In each period, each consumer wishes to buy a single unit either from ﬁrm A or B and
is willing to pay at most v. The reservation value v is suﬃciently high so that nobody stays
out of the market. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) consumers have exogenous preferences
for brands that are present from the start. Consumer preferences are speciﬁed in the Hotelling-
style linear market of unit length with ﬁrms positioned at the endpoints. A consumer brand
preference parameter x is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and remains ﬁxed for both periods of
consumption.10 As usual a consumer located at x incurs total cost pA + tx if buys from ﬁrm A
at the price pA, and incurs total cost pB + t(1− x) if buys the unit from B at the price pB.
Suppose ﬁrms cannot commit to future prices. Consumers reveal information about their
brand preferences by their ﬁrst-period choice. Suppose that standard competition à la Hotelling
allows ﬁrm A to attract a fraction of θ1. Firm A’s turf is the interval [0, θ1], while ﬁrm B’s turf
is the remaining [θ1, 1]. In period 2 each ﬁrm is able to recognise its own previous customers
and the rival’s ones.
Diﬀerently from the standard models of BBPD we assume that in the second-period there is
a two-stage competition game. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm simultaneously chooses a price to its
old customers poi and a price to the new customers p
n
i , i = A,B. Each consumer observes p
o
i and
pnj . Given a LPL switching process, those customers with an intention to switch (for whom the
rival’s oﬀer is more attractive) will contact the current supplier and request an authorization
code, which they must communicate to the new supplier to complete the switching process. It
is important to note that we assume that consumers do not bluﬀ, i.e., only consumers with
economic reasons to switch will in fact contact the current supplier. A consumer’s request of a
code signals his willingness to switch and gives ﬁrms an incentive to use retention strategies to
tempt them to stay. In other words, ﬁrms can employ retention strategies like a price discount
in an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing ﬁrm. This
paper analyses the case where in the second stage each ﬁrm oﬀers each customer showing an
intention to leave (i.e., requesting a code) a secret ﬁxed discount di.
3 Price discrimination without retention strategies
As a benchmark, suppose ﬁrst that ﬁrms can price discriminate between old/new customers but
are not allowed to use save/retention strategies either because in period 2 they cannot distinguish
those customers willing to switch or because price discrimination between diﬀerent types of old
9The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results derived
throughout the model.
10For BBPD model with imperfect correlated preferences across periods see Chen and Pearcy (2010).
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customers is not permitted. The analysis here is similar to that of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
Proposition 1. When ﬁrms can only price discriminate between old/new customers second
period equilibrium prices are:
(i) if θ1 ≤
1
4 :
p
o,NR
A = t (1− 2θ1) ; p
n,NR
A =
1
3
t (3− 4θ1)
p
o,NR
B =
1
3
t (3− 2θ1) ; p
n,NR
B = 0
(ii) if 14 ≤ θ1 ≤
3
4 :
p
o,NR
A =
1
3
t (2θ1 + 1) ; p
n,NR
A =
1
3
t (3− 4θ1)
p
o,NR
B =
1
3
t (3− 2θ1) ; p
n,NR
B =
1
3
t (4θ1 − 1)
(iii) if θ1 ≥
3
4 :
p
o,NR
A =
1
3
t (2θ1 + 1) ; p
n,NR
A = 0
p
o,NR
B = t(2θ1 − 1); p
n,NR
B =
1
3
t (4θ1 − 1)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1. When θ1 =
1
2 , ﬁrms will share equally the market in period 2, s
2,NR
A =
s
2,NR
B =
1
2 . If θ1 >
1
2 then s
2,NR
A <
1
2 and s
2,NR
B >
1
2 . The reverse happens when θ1 <
1
2 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 is useful to evaluate the impact of BBPD when ﬁrms depart with an inherited
exogenous base of customers. It shows that if ﬁrms depart with an equal base of customers,
they will share equally the market in period 2. If ﬁrms have asymmetric inherited market share,
the smaller ﬁrm will become the leader in period 2 and the larger ﬁrm will become the smaller
one. In a static analyses Gehrig et al. (2012) show that uniform pricing is a more powerful
instrument than BBPD for the dominant ﬁrm to defend its market share advantage.
It is straightforward to obtain that at the interior solution, i.e., if 14 ≤ θ1 ≤
3
4 both ﬁrms
make the same proﬁt in the second period, given by
π2i =
5
9
t

2θ21 − 2θ1 + 1

. (1)
Thus we can see that each ﬁrm’s second-period proﬁt is minimized when ﬁrms share the ﬁrst
period market equally. The reason is that an equal initial market share generates the most
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informative outcome in the second period, and, in this setting with best response asymmetry,
more information destroys proﬁt. When initial market shares are very asymmetric, on the other
hand, little is learned about most consumers’ brand preferences, competition is less intense and
proﬁts increase. In Esteves (2010) more information leads to more intense competition and to a
less favourable competitive outcome. Thus, it shows that ﬁrms may be willing to forgo a positive
market share in period 1 as an eﬀective way to eschew learning and price discrimination in the
subsequent period.
Turn now to ﬁrst-period competition. Let p1i represent ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-period price, i = A,B.
Following Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There is a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) First-period equilibrium prices are p1,NRA = p
1,NR
B = t

1 + δ3

and the ﬁrst-period market
is split symmetrically with θ1

p1A, p
1
B

= 12 .
(ii) Second-period equilibrium prices are po,NRA = p
o,NR
B =
2
3t and p
n,NR
A = p
n,NR
B =
1
3t.
(iii) Consumers in the intervals

0, 13

and

2
3 , 1

do not switch and consumers in the interval
1
3 ,
2
3

do switch in the second-period.
4 Price discrimination with retention strategies
As usual we solve the game working backwards from the second period.
4.1 Second-period
Suppose that ﬁrst period prices lead to a cutoﬀ θ1 ∈ [0, 1] . A consumer located at θ1 is indiﬀerent
between buying from A and B in period 1. Look ﬁrst at ﬁrm A’s turf on [0, θ1] . In the group
of ﬁrm A’s old consumers there is group of consumers who may be willing to switch given
the observed second period prices {poA, p
n
B} . As suggested in the Ofcom report assume that
those consumers willing to switch from A to B, need to contact ﬁrm A and request a code to
complete the switching process. This contact will allow ﬁrm A to recognise within the base of
old customers those who are willing to leave. Save activity in a form of a secret discount dA will
be used by ﬁrm A to tempt these consumers to stay.
In the second-stage of period 2, the indiﬀerent consumer between staying with A after a
receiving a save oﬀer and pay price poA−dA and switching to B paying p
n
B is located at xA, given
by:
poA − dA + txA = p
n
B + t (1− xA) .
It follows that
xA =
1
2
+
pnB − p
o
A + dA
2t
(2)
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Figure 1: Behaviour-based price discrimination with retention strategies
The indiﬀerent consumer between acting as a passive (i.e., showing no intention to switch) and as
an active (i.e., showing an intention to switch) is located at xcA such that U(p
o
A, dA = 0) = U(p
n
B).
From this condition we obtain:
xcA =
1
2
+
pnB − p
o
A
2t
. (3)
Similar derivations allow us to obtain xcB. In the second stage ﬁrms A and B solve, respect-
ively, the following problem:
Max
dA
(poA − dA) (xA − x
c
A)
Max
dB
(poB − dB) (x
c
B − xB)
from which it is straightforward to obtain that the secret discount oﬀered by ﬁrm A is dA =
po
A
2
and by ﬁrm B is dB =
poB
2 .
With no loss of generality look on ﬁrm A’s turf. In the ﬁrst-stage of period 2 ﬁrm A and B
solve respectively:
Max
po
A
πoA = p
o
Ax
c
A + (p
o
A − dA)(xA − x
c
A) s.t dA =
poA
2
Max
pn
B
πnB = p
n
B (θ1 − xA) s.t. dA =
poA
2
A similar reasoning is applied to ﬁrm B’s turf. Simple computations allow us to obtain
Proposition 3.
Figure 1 illustrates the diﬀerent segments of consumers.
Proposition 3. When ﬁrms can employ poaching and retention strategies second period
equilibrium prices are:
(i) if θ1 ≤
1
3 :
poA = t (1− 2θ1) ; p
n
A =
2
5
t (2− 3θ1)
poB =
2
5
t (3− 2θ1) ; dB =
1
5
t (3− 2θ1) ; p
n
B = 0
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(ii) if 13 ≤ θ1 ≤
2
3 :
poA =
2
5
t (2θ1 + 1) ; dA =
1
5
t (2θ1 + 1) ; p
n
A =
2
5
t (2− 3θ1)
poB =
2
5
t (3− 2θ1) ; dB =
1
5
t (3− 2θ1) ; p
n
B =
2
5
t (3θ1 − 1) .
(iii) if θ1 ≥
2
3 :
poA =
2
5
t (2θ1 + 1) ; dA =
1
5
t (2θ1 + 1) ; p
n
A = 0
poB = t(2θ1 − 1); p
n
B =
2
5
t (3θ1 − 1)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note ﬁrst that ﬁrms only engage in save activity when their customer base is above a
threshold. Firm A, for instance, will only employ save activity if θ1 >
1
3 . Additionally, the
retention discount obtained is equal to 50% of the second period current price to old custom-
ers. The Ofcom report (2010, p.82) shows that retention discounts varied between 32% and
60% of the current price in mobile telephony and between 25% and 44% of the current price in
broadband services.
The next corollaries shed some light on the eﬀects of BBPD with retention strategies when
the ﬁrms in the industry have inherited market shares.
Corollary 3. Moving from uniform pricing to BBPD with save activity:
(i) increases the price for ﬁrm A passive consumers, i.e., poA > p
u as long as θ1 >
3
4 ,
otherwise poA < p
u.
(ii) decreases the price for active and new consumers, regardless of ﬁrm A’s inherited market
share.
Given the second period nash equilibrium prices deﬁned in proposition 1 and 3 it is straight-
forward to prove the corollary 4.
Corollary 4. From the comparison of BBPD with and with no save activity:
(i) ﬁrm A’s passive consumers pay higher prices with save activity when θ1 >
1
3 .
(ii) ﬁrm A’s active saved customers pay higher prices when θ1 <
4
7 , while they pay a lower
price when θ1 >
4
7 .
(iii) ﬁrm A’s price to new customer under save activity is always below its counterpart when
this activity is banned.
Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of second-period equilibrium prices given an inherited
market share with and without retention strategies in ﬁrm A’s turf A assuming that t = 1.
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Figure 2: Second-period prices with and without retention strategies
Like in BBPD with no retention strategies, when ﬁrms employ retention strategies all prices,
for active and passive consumers, may end up being higher than if save activity was not al-
lowed/feasible (one uniform price for all existing consumers). Note however that if we have for
instance a big enough ﬁrm in the market (say A, θ1 >
3
4) some of its passive customers may be
exploited and pay a higher price with BBPD with save activity than with no discrimination.
Compare next BBPD with and with no save activity. Firm A’s existing consumers pay the
same price with and without save activity when ﬁrm A’s market share is too low, speciﬁcally
when θ1 ≤
1
4 . At the interior solution (not too strong asymmetry between ﬁrms), as ﬁrms are
able to segment their existing customer base between “active” and “passive” they can charge
a much higher price to passive consumers than if retention activity was banned (poA > p
o,NR
A ).
Note also that ﬁrms only engage in save activity when their customer base is above a threshold.
Firm A, for instance, will only employ save activity if θ1 >
1
3 . When we move from BBPD with
no save activity to BBPD with save activity we ﬁnd that saved customers pay higher prices
when θ1 <
4
7 , while they pay a lower price under save activity when θ1 >
4
7 . The reason is that
when θ1 >
1
2 some consumers in ﬁrm A’s turf A are B-oriented consumers, thus ﬁrm A needs
to price more aggressively if it wants to avoid switching. Additionally, with retention activity
ﬁrms have more diﬃculty in attracting the rival’s customers, thus ﬁrm A’s poaching price to new
customers (pni ) under save activity is always below its counterpart when this retention activity
is banned.
Corollary 5. When ﬁrms have symmetric initial market shares they split equally the market
in the second-period. When θ1 ∈

1
3 ,
2
3

BBPD with retention strategies leads the dominant ﬁrm
to lose its dominance, that is s2A ≤
1
2

s2B ≥
1
2

if θ1 ≥
1
2

θ1 ≤
1
2

. In contrast, the bigger ﬁrm is
able to maintain its dominance when the asymmetry in the market is strong enough. Particularly,
it follows that s2A ≥
1
2

s2B ≤
1
2

if θ1 ∈

3
4 , 1

and s2A ≤
1
2

s2B ≥
1
2

if θ1 ∈

0, 14

.
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Figure 3: Firm A’s second-period market share
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3 plots ﬁrm A’s second period market share when ﬁrms have an exogenous initial
customer base and can engage in BBPD with and without save activity, respectively given s2A
and s2,NRA . It conﬁrms the ﬁndings in Corollaries 1 and 5. We can see that when ﬁrms can
only discriminate between old/new customer the bigger ﬁrm (initial market share higher than
50% of the market) always loses its dominance with this form of BBPD. It is interesting to
note for any θ1 ≥ 0.5, s
2
A ≥ s
2,NR
A . Thus, in fact BBPD with save activity helps the bigger
to maintain their previous clientele. Note also that, when ﬁrms can price discriminate between
old/new customers and between diﬀerent categories of old customers, BBPD may not destroy
the dominance of the bigger ﬁrm. This happens when the initial market share of the bigger ﬁrm
is suﬃciently high (i.e., higher than 75% of the market). If ﬁrm A has an initial market share
of 90%, BBPD with save activity will reduce its second-period market share to 56%. Although
this form of price discrimination makes the market more competitive it does not destroy ﬁrm
A’s dominance (which still remains above 50%).
Corollary 6 summarizes second period equilibrium proﬁts.
Corollary 6. Second-period equilibrium proﬁts with BBPD and retention strategies are:
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(ii) when θ1 <
1
3 :
π2A = t (1− 2θ1) θ1 +
2
25
t (3θ1 − 2)
2 (4)
π2B =
3
50
t (2θ1 − 3)
2 (5)
(ii) when 13 < θ1 <
2
3 :
π2A =
3
50
t (2θ1 + 1)
2 +
2
25
t (3θ1 − 2)
2 =
1
50
t

48θ21 − 36θ1 + 19

(6)
π2B =
3
50
t (2θ1 − 3)
2 +
2
25
t (3θ1 − 1)
2 =
1
50
t

48θ21 − 60θ1 + 31

(7)
(iii) when θ1 >
2
3 :
π2A =
3
50
t (2θ1 + 1)
2 (8)
π2B = (1− θ1) t(2θ1 − 1) +
2
25
t (3θ1 − 1)
2 (9)
2
Api
2
Api
2
Bpi
2
Bpi
2nd Period 
Profits
A’s initial 
market share
Figure 4: Second-period proﬁts
Figure 4 plots both ﬁrms’ second-period proﬁts as a function of θ1 (ﬁrm A’s initial customer
base). It allows us to assess the eﬀects of BBPD with save activity when ﬁrms have initial
asymmetric customer bases. From a static point of view, as expected, we observe that the
dominant ﬁrm earns higher proﬁts than the smaller ﬁrm. We have seen that with no retention
activity, at the interior solution (14 ≤ θ1 ≤
3
4) both ﬁrms make the same proﬁt in the second
period. With save activity this is no longer the case. At the interior solution (13 ≤ θ1 ≤
2
3)
both ﬁrms earn the same proﬁt only when they are initially symmetric and each ﬁrm’s proﬁt
increases with its own initial market share. Taking now into account the intertemporal eﬀects
13
of BBPD with save activity, we should expect that each ﬁrm has a strategic incentive to build
up its ﬁrst-period market share. This reasoning will be useful to understand the price behavior
of forward looking ﬁrms in period 1.
4.2 First-period
Next we look at the choice of ﬁrst-period prices. Consumers and ﬁrms are forward looking and
both use the same discount factor δ. Because ﬁrms are forward looking they take today’s price
decisions rationally anticipating how they will aﬀect their subsequent proﬁt. Consumers are
sophisticated in the sense that they anticipate the eﬀect of initial market share on future prices.
Let ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period price be p1A and B’s ﬁrst-period price be p
1
B. The marginal consumer
in the ﬁrst period will surely switch in the second period to take advantage of the poaching price.
If ﬁrst-period prices lead to a cutoﬀ θ1 the consumer located at θ1 is indiﬀerent between buying
from ﬁrm A in period 1 at price p1A and then buying from B in period 2 at the poaching price
pnB, or buying from B in period 1 at price p
1
B and then buying from A at the poaching price p
n
A.
At an interior solution we must observe:
p1A + tθ1 + δ (p
n
B + t (1− θ1)) = p
1
B + (1− θ1) t+ δ (p
n
A + tθ1)
from which we obtain:
θ1 =
t+ p1B − p
1
A + δ [p
n
A (θ1)− p
n
B (θ1)]
2t (1− δ)
Using the expressions obtained for pnA and p
n
B in Proposition 3 it follows that:
θ1 =
5

t− p1A + p
1
B

+ tδ
2t (δ + 5)
=
1
2
+
5

p1B − p
1
A

2t (δ + 5)
(10)
Note that when price discrimination is not permitted or when the discount factor is zero θ1 =
t−p1A+p
1
B
2t .With no discrimination
∂θ1
∂p1
A
= − 12t . With save activity in period 2 we ﬁnd that:
∂θ1
∂p1A
= −
1
2t

δ
5 + 1

Thus, as long as δ > 0, consumers react less sensitively to price reductions in the ﬁrst period than
they would in a static model of this kind. Additionally under poaching with no save activity we
have that θ1 =
1
2 +
3(p1B−p1A)
2t(δ+3) and
∂θ1
∂p1
A
= − 1
2t( δ3+1)
. It is straightforward to see that sophisticated
consumers react less sensitively to price reductions in the ﬁrst period if save/retention activity
is possible in period 2.
Now consider the equilibrium choices of p1A and p
1
B. At an interior solution, ﬁrm A and B’s
overall objective function is, respectively given by:
p1A

1
2
+
5

p1B − p
1
A

2t (δ + 5)

+ δ

1
50
t

48

θ1

p1A, p
1
B
2
− 36θ1

p1A, p
1
B

+ 19
	

, (11)
14
p1B

1
2
+
5

p1A − p
1
B

2t (δ + 5)

+ δ

1
50
t

48

θ1

p1A, p
1
B
2
− 60

θ1

p1A, p
1
B

+ 31
	

. (12)
Substituting (10) in (11) and (12) it is straightforward to obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4. There is a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) ﬁrst-period equilibrium prices are p1A = p
1
B = t

1− δ25

and both ﬁrms share equally the
market in period 1, thus θ1

p1A, p
1
B

= 12 .
(ii) second-period equilibrium prices are poA = p
o
B =
4
5t, dA = dB =
2
5t and p
n
A = p
n
B =
1
5t.
(iii) Consumers in the intervals

0, 15

and

4
5 , 1

behave as passive, consumers in the inter-
vals

1
5 ,
2
5

and

3
5 ,
4
5

show an intention to switch in period 2 and are retained, consumers in
the intervals

2
5 ,
3
5

show an intention to leave and do in fact switch to a diﬀerent supplier in
period 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As usual the ﬁrst period equilibrium price under BBPD with save activity is below the
non-discrimination level. An interesting ﬁnding of the paper is that the ﬁrst-period price with
retention strategies is below the uniform price and its counterpart when BBPD is used alone.
We have seen before that in Fudenberg-Tirole model with a uniform distribution of preferences a
change of ﬁrst-period prices has no eﬀect on second-period proﬁt because a ﬁrm’s marginal gains
in one second-period market are exactly oﬀset by losses in the other. Thus, in the uniform case
the result of ﬁrst period equilibrium prices above the non-discrimination levels is only explained
by the decrease in price sensitivity of forward-looking consumers in period 1.
In contrast, when we allow ﬁrms to oﬀer a retention discount to those customers showing
an intention to switch, we observe that ﬁrms do take into account that a change in ﬁrst-period
prices changes the ﬁrst-period cut-oﬀ θ1 and therefore aﬀects second-period competition. With
retention strategies consumers are more price sensitive and forward looking ﬁrms have strategic
incentives to decrease ﬁrst period prices as a way to build up ﬁrst period market share.11 As a
result of these two forces ﬁrst period prices fall.
Additional results emerge from Propositions 3 and 5. With BBPD and no retention strategies
the consumers in the interval

0, 13

and

2
3 , 1

do not switch in equilibrium and their present value
payment for the two periods of consumption is (1 + δ) t, which is equal to its counterpart with
no discrimination. In other word, in the Fudenberg-Tirole model for these groups of consumers
price discrimination has no eﬀect on consumer welfare and proﬁts. In contrast the consumers
in the interval

1
3 ,
2
3

switch from one ﬁrm to another and the present value of their payment
is equal to (1 + δ) t − δ3t. This group of consumers is strictly better oﬀ under BBPD with no
retention strategies than under no discrimination.
11 If we look at the eﬀect of ﬁrst-period prices on second-period proﬁt given by ∂π
2
∂p1
A
we observe that in the
symmetric equilibrium it is equal to − 3
5
δ
δ+5
< 0.
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Look next at BBPD with retention oﬀers. The consumers in the intervals

0, 15

and

2
5 , 1

do not signal an intention to switch and the present value payment for the two periods of
consumption is (δ + 1) t− 6δt25 , lower than (1 + δ) t. Thus, even thought passive consumers face a
higher second-period price, the decrease in ﬁrst-period price more than compensates the second
period loss. The existing active consumers in the intervals

1
5 ,
2
5

and

3
5 ,
4
5

are retained. The
present value of the price paid by these consumers in both periods of consumption is (δ + 1) t−
16δt
25 . Thus, these consumers are clearly better oﬀ when ﬁrms employ BBPD with retention
discounts. Consumers in the intervals

1
3 ,
2
5

and

3
5 ,
2
3

decide not to switch when we move
from BBPD alone to BBPD with save oﬀers. The present value of their payment is equal to
(δ + 1) t − 6δt25 with retention discounts, while it is equal to (1 + δ) t −
δ
3 t with no save oﬀers.
These group of consumers also beneﬁt from save activity. Finally, the poached consumers in the
interval

2
5 ,
3
5

switch from one ﬁrm to another under retention strategies. The present value of
the price paid by them for the two periods of consumption is equal to (δ + 1) t− 21δt25 . Summing
up, BBPD with retention strategies reduces the present value of the price paid by consumer in
all segments, suggesting that retention oﬀers boost overall consumer surplus.
The previous discussion is important to explain the intuition behind the proﬁt eﬀects of save
oﬀers presented in corollary 6.
Corollary 6. (iii) Each ﬁrm second-period equilibrium proﬁt is equal to 1350t and ﬁrst period
equilibrium proﬁt equals t2

1− δ25

.
(iii) For any δ > 0 overall equilibrium proﬁt under BBPD with save activity is equal to
1
50 (12δ + 25) , lower than overall equilibrium proﬁt under BBPD with no save activity which is
equal to 118t (8δ + 9).
5 Welfare Analysis
This section looks at the welfare eﬀects of poaching with retention strategies. With no dis-
crimination consumers buy from the closer ﬁrm which is eﬃcient. The ﬁrst-period equilibrium
outcome is also eﬃcient with and without retention strategies. However, the second-period
switching lowers welfare. If we let ETC denote the expected transport cost incurred by con-
sumers overall welfare can be written as W = v −ETC.
Look ﬁrst at welfare in period 2. With no discrimination all consumers buy from the closer
ﬁrm in period 2. Thus second-period welfare with no discrimination, w2nd is
w2nd = v −
 1
2
0
txdx−
 1
1
2
t(1− x)dx = v −
1
4
t.
When ﬁrms can poach the rival’s previous customers and use simultaneously retention strategies
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second-period welfare is w2 :
w2 = v −
 xA
0
txdx−
 θ1
xA
t(1− x)dx−
 xB
θ1
txdx−
 1
xB
t(1− x)dx,
which in equilibrium is equal to:
w2 = v −
27
100
t.
When ﬁrms can only price discriminate between old/new customers (no retention strategies are
used) second period welfare is w2,NR given by:
w2,NR = v −
 1
3
θ1+
1
6
0
txdx−
 θ1
1
3
θ1+
1
6
t(1− x)dx−
 5
6
−
1
3
θ1
θ1
txdx−
 1
5
6
−
1
3
θ1
t(1− x)dx
= v −
11
36
t.
Look next at consumer surplus with retention strategies in period 2, denoted ECS2 =
w2−Industry Proﬁts. At the interior solution equilibrium solution we have:
ECS2 = v −
1
50
t

62θ21 − 62θ1 + 55

.
Similarly, consumer surplus with no retention strategies in period 2, denoted ECS2,NR equals:
ECS2,NR = v −
1
9
t

13θ21 − 15θ1 + 12

.
Next we investigate the eﬀect of poaching with retention strategies on overall industry proﬁt,
consumer surplus and welfare. Overall welfare is given by W = w1 + δw2. Overall welfare with
no discrimination is:
Wnd = v (1 + δ)−
t
4
−
tδ
4
.
With retention strategies overall welfare is given by
W = v (1 + δ)−
1
4
t−
27
100
t,
while with no retention strategies it equals:
WNR = v (1 + δ)−
1
4
t−
11δ
36
t.
From corollary 6, equilibrium industry proﬁt under BBPD with save activity is πind =
2

1
50t (12δ + 25)

while with no retention strategies it is equal to πNRind =
2
18 t (8δ + 9) . We can
now compute overall consumer surplus with and without retention strategies, respectively given
by
CS = v −
5
4
t−
3
4
tδ + vδ
and
CSNR = v −
5
4
t−
43
36
tδ + vδ
It is straightforward to obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 5. For any δ > 0 price discrimination based on customer recognition is bad
for proﬁts and welfare but good for consumers. However, conditional on price discrimination
being permitted, the use of retention strategies boosts consumer surplus and overall welfare and
decreases industry proﬁt.
Our analysis of BBPD with save activity predicts that industry proﬁts are lower and con-
sumers’ surplus is higher under save activity than without save activity because overall the lower
prices for those consumers that switch more than compensate the higher prices for those con-
sumers that do not switch. Because in the present model there is no role for price discrimination
to increase aggregate output, variations in welfare are uniquely explained by the “disutility”
supported by those consumers who do not buy the most preferred brand.12 As save activity
reduces the ineﬃcient switching welfare increases when ﬁrms use retention strategies.
6 Conclusions
The economics literature on price discrimination by purchase history has hitherto focused on
the assumption that (i) ﬁrms have only the required information to price discriminate between
old and new customers and (ii) ﬁrms have no way to react to the rivals’ poaching oﬀers. In-
terestingly, in some of the markets where ﬁrms often price discriminate between their own and
the rivals’ consumers, the switching processes currently in place in many countries have allowed
ﬁrms to become aware of an existing customer’s willingness to leave before the switching takes
place. Consequently, ﬁrms have been increasingly able to recognise diﬀerent categories of old
customers−those willing to stay and those willing to switch−and try to raise switching barriers
by engaging in retention/save activities.
This paper has taken a ﬁrst step in investigating the impact of behaviour-based price discrim-
ination in markets where ﬁrms are allowed to engage in save activity, in the form of a discount,
as an attempt to retain their previous customers.
The static second-period analysis highlights that ﬁrms will only engage in save activity when
their customer base is above a threshold (i.e., above 33%). It also sheds some light on whether
or not poaching with retention strategies helps a dominant ﬁrm (with a market share above
50%) to maintain its dominant position. If BBPD is possible but save activity is forbidden,
the dominant ﬁrm will lose its dominance under BBPD. In contrast, if the dominant ﬁrm is
big enough (with market share above 75%), BBPD with save activity makes the market more
competitive but allows the bigger ﬁrm to maintain its dominance.
While static analysis is a useful tool, the dynamic analysis is the most appropriate to inform
competition authorities speciﬁcally for assessing businesses practices that exhibit intertemporal
features. Take into account the intertemporal eﬀects of BBPD with save activity the paper
shows that ﬁrst period equilibrium price with retention strategies is below its non-discrimination
12For a model with BBPD with elastic demands see Esteves and Regiani (2012).
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counterpart, which contrasts with ﬁrst period price above the non-discrimination level when
these business strategies are forbidden. Regarding second period prices, we ﬁnd that save activity
leads to higher prices for those consumers who do not signal an intention to switch. The reverse
happens to those consumers who decide to switch after being exposed to retention strategies.
However, the present value of the price paid by passive consumers is lower under save activity
than when it is banned, suggesting that even thought passive consumers face a higher second-
period price, the decrease in ﬁrst-period price more than compensates the second period loss.
In sum the paper shows that BBPD with retention strategies reduces the present value of the
price paid by consumer in all segments.
Therefore, a relevant contribution of the paper is to shed some light on the welfare and
antitrust concerns of poaching and retention strategies. As in other models where consumers
have stable exogenous brand preferences, in comparison to uniform pricing the instrument of
behavior based price discrimination is bad for proﬁts and welfare and good for consumers.
However, when BBPD is employed the additional tool of save activity further decreases proﬁts
and boosts overall consumer surplus and welfare. Particularly, welfare increases due to a lower
degree of ineﬃcient switching.
Like other models of BBPD, the model presented in this paper has some limitations which
are left for further research. The unit demand assumption may be one limitation.13 It implies
that, in these models, output is constant whatever the pricing policy (discriminatory or uniform)
and the price levels. Prices only aﬀect how the total surplus available in the economy is shared
between consumers and ﬁrms. In these models, a pricing policy that generates more switching
will yield a lower welfare. Even thought the unit-demand assumption may not be a limitation
on the welfare predictions when all prices are unambiguously higher or lower under one scenario
compared to another, it does put some limits on the predictions when this is not the case. As
the present model predicts that the present value of the price paid by all consumer segments
decreases with save activity, extending the model to elastic demands would produce the same
qualitative welfare results. Secondly, it was assumed that consumer preferences were distributed
uniformly. It would be important to understand what changes if there is a large tail of consumers
with preferences for one ﬁrm and a small tail of consumers with preferences for the other. Finally,
in this model it was assumed that ﬁrms oﬀer the same discount to all consumers expressing an
intention to leave. In practice, ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent discounts to consumers and these may be the
outcome of a “bargaining process” which may be inﬂuenced by the consumer’s level of brand
loyalty.
Notwithstanding the model addressed in this paper has is far from covering all complex as-
pects of real markets, it has tried to oﬀer a closer approximation of reality where ﬁrms have
increasingly more consumer information to react to the rivals’ poaching oﬀers. Although any
13For a paper on BBPD with elastic demands see Esteves and Regiani (2012).
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advice to a regulatory authority should take into account the features of each market, in those
markets that could be reasonably well represented by the features of the current model, re-
strictions on the ability of ﬁrms to employ retention oﬀers would beneﬁt industry proﬁts at the
expense of consumer welfare.
A Proofs
Some of the proofs in this technical appendix need to be improved.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider second-period competition in ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst period
customer base [0, θ1]. Let p
o
A represent ﬁrm A’s price to its previous customers and p
n
B ﬁrm B’s
poaching price.
The indiﬀerent consumer between buying again from A at price poA and switching to B and
pay pnB is located at θA such that
poA + tθA = p
n
B + t (1− θA)
θA =
1
2
+
pnB − p
o
A
2t
This implies that at prices poA, p
n
B, consumers in the interval [0, θA] have a strong preference from
A and buy again product A. Diﬀerently, consumers in the interval [θA, θ1] switch from A to B.
Using similar arguments it is straightforward to show that in B’s turf the indiﬀerent consumer
between staying with B and switching to A is located at
θB =
1
2
+
poB − p
n
A
2t
.
Thus, consumers in the interval [θ1, θB] switch from B to A and consumers in the interval [θB, 1]
buy again from B. In A’s turf, each ﬁrm solves the following problem
Max
po
A

poA

1
2
+
pnB − p
o
A
2t


Max
pn
B

pnB

θ1 −
1
2
−
pnB − p
o
A
2t


Firm A´s best response is
poA =
1
2
t+
1
2
pnB
and ﬁrm B’s best response is
pnB =
1
2
poA −
1
2
t+ tθ1
It thus follows that
poA =
1
3
t (2θ1 + 1)
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pnB =
1
3
t (4θ1 − 1)
It is straightforward to obtain that the equilibrium prices in turf B are
poB =
1
3
t (3− 2θ1)
pnA =
1
3
t (3− 4θ1)
Note however that it is a dominated strategy for each ﬁrm to quote a poaching price below
the marginal cost, which in this case is equal to zero. From pnB ≥ 0 it must be true that θ1 ≥
1
4 .
Otherwise, i.e., when θ1 ≤
1
4 it follows that p
n
B = 0, and and so ﬁrm A’s best response in order
no to lose the marginal consumer located at θ1 is to quote p
o
A+ tθ1 = t (1− θ1) , from which we
obtain poA = t (1− 2θ1) . Thus, when θ1 ≤
1
4 second-period equilibrium prices are
poA = t (1− 2θ1) ; p
n
A =
1
3
t (3− 4θ1)
poB =
1
3
t (3− 2θ1) ; p
n
B = 0
Similarly it is straightforward to ﬁnd that if θ1 ≥
3
4
poA =
1
3
t (2θ1 + 1) ; p
n
A = 0
poB = t(2θ1 − 1); p
n
B =
1
3
t (4θ1 − 1) .
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. From these second-period equilibrium prices it is easy to obtain
that each ﬁrm second-period market share, s2A and s
2
B. At the interior solution θ1 ∈

1
4 ,
3
4

s2A =
2− θ1
3
and s2B =
1 + θ1
3
When θ1 ∈

0, 14

s2A =
2θ1 + 3
6
and s2B =
3− 2θ1
6
When θ1 ∈

3
4 , 1

s2A =
1
6
(2θ1 + 1) and s
2
B =
1
6
(5− 2θ1) .
Straightforward computations prove that when θ1 ∈

1
4 ,
3
4

, s2A >
1
2

s2B <
1
2

iﬀ θ1 <
1
2 while
s2A <
1
2

s2B <
1
2

iﬀ iﬀ θ1 >
1
2 . In the interval θ1 ∈

0, 14

, s2A >
1
2

s2B <
1
2

iﬀ θ1 > 0, which is
always true. Finally, when θ1 ∈

3
4 , 1

it follows that s2A <
1
2

s2B >
1
2

iﬀ θ1 < 1 which is always
true.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Look ﬁrst at ﬁrm A’s turf. Given that in the second stage of
period 2 ﬁrm A oﬀers a discount dA =
po
A
2 to consumers showing an intention to leave ﬁrm B
anticipates this behaviour and solves the following problem in the ﬁrst stage of period 2:
Max
pn
B
πnB = p
n
B

θ1 −
1
2
−
pnB − p
o
A + dA
2t


s.t d =
poA
2
From the FOC we obtain:
pn =
1
4
poA −
1
2
t+ tθ1
In the ﬁrst stage of period 2 ﬁrm A solves the following problem:
Max
po
A
{poAx
c
A + (p
o
A − dA)(xA − x
c
A)}
from which we obtain:
poA =
2
3
t+
2
3
pnB
Thus,
poA =
2
5
t (2θ1 + 1) ;
dA =
1
5
t (2θ1 + 1) ;
pnB =
2
5
t (3θ1 − 1) as long as θ1 >
1
3
Note that if θ1 ≤
1
3 , p
n
B = 0 and so the best response of ﬁrm A is to quote p
o
A = t (1− 2θ1) .
In the group of ﬁrm B’s past consumers there is group of consumers who might be induced
to switch given poA and p
n
B. Under Losing Provider Led this consumers will contact ﬁrm B as
a way to switch to A. Given this contact ﬁrm B oﬀers a discount d as a way to retain these
customers. The indiﬀerent consumer between buying again from B at price poB−d and switching
to A is located at xB:
pnA + txB = p
o
B + t (1− xB)− d
from which we obtain
xB =
1
2
+
poB − p
n
A − dB
2t
Note that the indiﬀerent consumers between contacting ﬁrm B is located at xcB such that:
U(poB, d = 0) ≥ U(p
n
A)
poB + t(1− x
c
B) = p
n
A + t (x
c
B)
xcB =
1
2
+
poB − p
n
A
2t
Thus in the second stage ﬁrm B solves the following problem
Max (poB − dB) (x
c
B − xB)
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From FOC it follows that
dB =
poB
2
In the ﬁrst stage of period 2 ﬁrm A solves the following problem:
Max
pn
A
πnA = p
n
A (xB − θ1) s.t. dB =
poB
2
From the FOC we have that:
pnA =
1
2
t+
1
4
poB − tθ1
In the ﬁrst stage of period 2 ﬁrm B solves the following problem:
Max
po
B
{poB (1− x
c
B) + (p
o
B − dB)(x
c
B − xB)}
It follows that
poB =
2
5
t (3− 2θ1)
poB − dB =
1
5
t (3− 2θ1)
pnA =
2
5
t (2− 3θ1) for θ1 <
2
3
If θ1 ≥
2
3 it follows that p
n
A = 0 and so the best response of ﬁrm B is to charge p
o
B =
t(2θ1 − 1).
Proof of Corollary 5. From the second-period equilibrium prices it is easy to obtain that
second-period market shares are at the interior solution where 13 ≤ θ1 ≤
2
3 given by
s2A = xA + (xB − θ1) =
3
5
−
1
5
θ1
s2B = 1− s
2
A =
2 + θ1
5
In this case it follows that s2A ≥
1
2

s2B ≤
1
2

iﬀ θ1 ≤
1
2 .
When θ1 ∈

0, 13

s2A = xB =
2θ1 + 2
5
s2B = 1− s
2
A =
3− 2θ1
5
Thus,
s2A ≤
1
2

s2B ≥
1
2


iﬀ θ1 ∈

0,
1
4

s2A ≥
1
2

s2B ≤
1
2


iﬀ θ1 ∈

1
4
,
1
3

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Finally when θ1 ∈

2
3 , 1

:
s2A = xA =
2θ1 + 1
5
s2B = 1− s
2
A =
2(2− θ1)
5
Therefore,
s2A ≥
1
2

s2B ≤
1
2


iﬀ θ1 ∈

3
4
, 1

s2A ≤
1
2

s2B ≥
1
2


iﬀ θ1 ∈

2
3
,
3
4


Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the equilibrium choices of p1A and p
1
B. Firm A’s and
B’s overall objective function are respectively
p1Aθ1

p1A, p
1
B

+
δt
50

48

θ1

p1A, p
1
B
2
− 36θ1

p1A, p
1
B

+ 19
	
and
p1B

1− θ1

p1A, p
1
B

+
δt
50

48

θ1

p1A, p
1
B
2
− 60

θ1

p1A, p
1
B

+ 31
	
Thus from the FOC with respect to p1A and p
1
B we obtain ﬁrms A and B best-response functions
respectively given by
p1A

p1B

=
125t+ 125p1B + 20tδ − 95p
1
Bδ − tδ
2
250− 70δ
(13)
and
p1B

p1A

=
125t+ 125p1A + 20tδ − 95p
1
Aδ − tδ
2
250− 70δ
(14)
from which we obtain
p1A = p
1
B = t

1−
δ
25


Second-order condition for this problem is given by 7δ−25
t(δ+5)2
which is negative for all δ ∈
[0, 1] .
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